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Introduction 
Prior to the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework being enacted by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) in 2011, much discussion on access to pandemic influenza 
vaccines (‘PIVs’) had centred on the fact that samples of the virus used to produce a PIV 
were likely to have been supplied by developing states, which then struggled to purchase the 
resulting vaccine.  A major impetus for the creation of the Framework was the 2005-H5N1 1
virus sharing incident, during which Indonesia departed from the established norm of sharing 
pandemic influenza samples with the WHO.  Indonesia claimed that the samples were the 2
sovereign property of the State of Indonesia, and it was under no obligation to share them 
with the wider international community.  The Indonesian Government cited an unfair lack of 3
correlation between sharing samples and the benefits obtained in return as the primary reason 
for refusing to share samples.  Indeed, it was acknowledged by the WHO Intergovernmental 4
Meeting on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness that the pre-PIP system did not deliver fairness, 
transparency or equity to developing states,
 
and disproportionately benefited developed 5
states with their own vaccine manufacturing base, by allowing easy access to viral samples 
with which to develop a vaccine with no clear obligations to share the benefits.  
This argument is not without merit. During the 2009-H1N1 pandemic, there were significant 
disparities in vaccination coverage between developed and developing states: developed 
states were able to procure more vaccine, and procure it earlier in the pandemic, than 
developing states.  Since 2009-H1N1 global manufacturing capacity for PIVs has increased 6
from nearly 800 million doses per annum in 2009,  to 6.372 billion doses in 2015 doses per 7
annum at the most recent estimation in 2015.  However, 75% of the global influenza 8
manufacturing capacity is dedicated to meeting the needs of developed states in the Northern 
Hemisphere.  It is therefore unlikely that any increase in manufacturing capacity will have a 9
beneficial effect on pandemic preparedness in developing states, meaning that developing 
states will continue to be reliant upon donations from the WHO for access to the PIV. 
Through the PIP Framework the WHO sought to create a more formal method of 
procurement of vaccines for onward donation to developing states, in order to alleviate some 
of the problems highlighted by 2009-H1N1, and the Indonesian virus sharing incident 
respectively.  The process of enacting what eventually became the PIP Framework began in 10
2007,
 
with the passing of Resolution WHA 60.28 by the World Health Assembly. In this 11
Resolution the Assembly required that the WHO Director- General  
formulate mechanisms and guidelines, in close consultation with Member States, aimed 
at ensuring fair and equitable distribution of pandemic-influenza vaccines at affordable 
prices in the event of a pandemic, in order to ensure timely availability of such vaccines 
to Member States in need.  12
The Framework provides obligations and recommendations in two areas: first, the timely 
sharing of influenza viral samples with human pandemic potential between member states of 
the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System  (GISRS); and second, the 13
sharing of viral samples with entities that operate outside of GISRS, such as vaccine 
manufacturers, in return for these external entities sharing benefits with the WHO and its 
members.  The Framework aims to improve the procurement of PIV by developing states  14 15
by creating a more structured approach to collection and distribution of donated PIV than the 
ad-hoc manner in which the WHO has collected and donated vaccines in previous pandemics. 
This is intended to ensure that the PIV donated by manufacturers is not just given on an ad-
hoc basis after orders from fee-paying states have been fulfilled, or once self-procuring states 
have determined they have excess PIV to meet their needs, as was the case with donations 
during 2009-H1N1.  Instead, donations of PIV may be included within the company 16
obligations within Standard Material Transfer Agreements (SMTA)  completed via the PIP 17
Framework. These mandate that a proportion of the real-time PIV production is reserved for, 
and transferred to the WHO for onward donation to developing states, in return for the WHO 
sharing influenza viral samples with human pandemic potential.   18
The Framework has been hailed as an innovative mechanism for guaranteeing access to 
vaccines and affordable life-saving drugs during an influenza pandemic.  A number of 19
papers have considered the PIP Framework, and attempted to determine the impact the 
vaccine stockpile it creates will have on procurement of PIV in developing states. However, 
some of the literature expresses concern that the Framework is unable to make any real 
changes to vaccine allocation due to its inability to close the gap between developed and 
developing states where procurement of PIV is concerned.  This  literature has only 20
considered the benefit sharing provisions of the SMTAs as they were presented in the 
Appendix of the PIP Framework, as at the time, no SMTAs had been concluded with PIV 
manufacturers. The major development since this literature was generated is the fact that nine 
SMTAs have now been concluded between the WHO and pandemic influenza vaccine 
manufacturers. Each of these agreements outlines the ‘Obligations of the Company’ agreed 
between the WHO and pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers, and it is the content of 
these obligations which is the focus of this paper. Through examining the content of the 
‘Obligations of the Company’ which have been secured by the WHO I argue this paper gives 
a clearer indication of the true practical impact the PIP stockpile will have on procurement of 
PIV during the next pandemic. 
The PIP Framework and vaccine procurement 
The PIP Framework enables the WHO to manage a stockpile of approximately 150 million 
doses of PIV. This stockpile is created by requiring vaccine manufacturers who receive 
pandemic influenza virus samples from the WHO for vaccine development to contribute to 
the stockpile, via an SMTA. The stockpile is a virtual one, influenza vaccine manufacturer 
commit to supply a proportion of their real-time vaccine production to the WHO, and  in the 
event of an influenza pandemic, vaccine manufacturers supply x% of their real-time 
production to the WHO, and the WHO will then transfer from the stockpile to recipient 
states. The Framework provides that 
50 million doses of the stockpile will be for use in ‘affected countries, according to 
public health risk and need, to assist in containing the first outbreak or outbreaks of an 
emerging pandemic and 100 million for distribution….to developing countries that 
have no or inadequate access to....influenza vaccines, on a per capita basis that can be 
distributed to affected and at risk developing states during a pandemic.   21
Of particular note is the fact that the obligation that PIV manufactures have to contribute 
vaccine to the PIP stockpile is to be fulfilled at the same time as manufacturers’ contractual 
commitments to self-procuring states, including those with Advance Purchase Agreements in 
place , which was not the case during 2009-H1N1.  This means that those developing states 22 23
procuring vaccine from the PIP stockpile are intended to receive their vaccine in the same 
timeframe as self-procuring states, thereby ensuring that developing states can vaccinate 
members of their population earlier in the pandemic, which is crucial in reducing disease 
transmission, and preventing mortality and morbidity from a pandemic influenza virus.   24
The PIP Framework can rightly be described as a ‘milestone for global health’  based solely 25
on the fact that it is the first international agreement that has sought to address inequalities in 
virus sharing by developing states, and procurement of medical technologies stemming from 
such viruses. However, closer scrutiny of the terms and conditions the WHO has managed to 
secure in SMTA negotiations makes the Framework appear less impressive. 
PIP commitments  
PIV manufacturers who wish to receive PIP biological materials  by way of a Standard 26
Material Transfer Agreement with the WHO must commit to at least two of the following 
options 
A1. Donate at least 10% of real time pandemic vaccine production to WHO.  
A2. Reserve at least 10% of real time pandemic vaccine production at affordable 
prices to WHO.  
A3. Donate at least X treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for the 
pandemic to WHO. A4. Reserve at least X treatment courses of needed antiviral 
medicine for the pandemic at affordable prices. 
A5. Grant to manufacturers in developing countries licenses on mutually agreed terms 
that should be fair and reasonable including in respect of affordable royalties, taking 
into account development levels in the country of end use of the products, on 
technology, know-how, products and processes for which it holds intellectual property 
rights for the production of (i) influenza vaccines, (ii) adjuvants, (iii) antivirals and/or 
(iv) diagnostics.  
A6. Grant royalty-free licenses to manufacturers in developing countries or grant to 
WHO royalty-free, non-exclusive licenses on IPR, which can be sublicensed, for the 
production of pandemic influenza vaccines, adjuvants, antivirals products and 
diagnostics needed in a pandemic. WHO may sublicense these licenses to 
manufacturers in developing countries on appropriate terms and conditions and in 
accordance with sound public health principles.  27
These benefit sharing provisions of the Framework have been met with a good deal of 
support in the literature, on the basis that they will ensure increased access to vaccines for 
developing states during an influenza pandemic.  This support is given on the basis that 28
paragraphs 4.1.A.1 and 4.1.A.2 appear to commit manufacturers to provide at least 10% of 
their real time production to the WHO. However, the above provision has an accompanying 
footnote ‘[r]ecognizing that flexibility is important in negotiating with all manufacturers, in a 
range of 5–20%.’  Despite the fact that the Chair of the PIP negotiations envisioned that 29
SMTAs would be ‘standardised, universal and globally applicable to all transfers of PIP 
biological materials and not subject to further negotiation’ , there does appear to be a 30
significant amount of flexibility within the SMTA provided in the Framework. These flexible 
terms afford PIV manufacturers scope to negotiate terms regarding the donation of vaccines, 
antivirals, the granting of licenses, and transfer of technology. In addition, the relevant 
articles on liability and indemnities, warranties, duration and termination of contracts, 
governing law, and dispute resolution are not standardised within the Framework and remain 
simply ‘to be agreed by the parties’.  31
This is concerning for a number of reasons. Firstly, the fact that so many terms within the 
SMTA need to be agreed upon by the parties is likely to elongate the negotiation process ; 32
and given the fact that influenza pandemics are sporadic in nature, it is not entirely clear to 
what extent such a delay in the negotiations will impact on procurement from the stockpile 
during an influenza pandemic. Secondly, if it is not possible to reach a consensus on all the 
flexible terms, the negotiations will fail, and the SMTA will not enter into force, thereby 
leading to fewer vaccines being available for the PIP vaccine stockpile. Moreover, the fact 
that so much of the SMTA is flexible and subject to negotiation will likely provide the 
manufacturer with a stronger negotiating position than the WHO, as the manufacturer will be 
one of a very limited number of providers of a product that is in very high demand, and the 
WHO will be one of a number of potential consumers of such products.  
On the point of such flexible terms being included within the SMTA, and the fact that so 
much of the SMTA content remains to be negotiated between the parties, Wilke has expressed 
the view that having the WHO Secretariat lead on such negotiations may actually lead to a 
more equitable and effective outcome for developing states 
Unlike before the PIP Framework, when negotiations were conducted on a bilateral 
basis (often involving developing countries), it is the WHO that negotiates the final 
SMTA which introduce further checks and balances, thereby increasing the 
effectiveness, and more importantly, the equity.  33
The extent to which these compromises in the wording of the standardised SMTA, along with 
flexibilities in the donations of vaccines provisions in the PIP Framework, will have an 
impact on procurement of PIV by developing states is explored more fully later in this paper. 
Prior to considering the content of the SMTAs that have been concluded between the WHO 
and PIV manufacturers, it is necessary to note the low take-up of these agreements amongst 
PIV manufacturers, as the number of manufacturers with an SMTA will clearly impact upon 
the effectiveness of the PIP stockpile as a procurement method for developing states. 
SMTA uptake amongst manufactures 
In the most recent review of PIV manufacturing capacity, Partridge & Kieny (on behalf of the 
WHO) identified twenty-four manufacturers that are active in manufacturing pandemic 
influenza vaccines . In addition to this categorisation of influenza manufacturers, the WHO, 34
when calculating partnership contributions for the running costs of GISRS , identifies those 35
influenza vaccine, diagnostic and pharmaceutical manufacturers using the WHO-GISRS, in 
order for them to contribute to the running costs.  Of those manufacturers identified by 36
Partridge & Kieny, eighteen also make partnership contributions to the WHO, on the basis 
that they use the WHO-GISRS . Yet, despite the fact that eighteen active PIV manufactures 37
have been identified as having benefited from the work of GISRS, only nine of these 
manufacturers have an SMTA in place.  
Prior to the implementation of the PIP Framework Kamradt-Scott & Lee expressed concern 
that requiring PIV manufacturers to make partnership contributions for the running costs of 
GISRS could have the unintended consequence of forcing vaccine manufacturers out of the 
market, and thereby reducing the overall global vaccine capacity 
The imposition of what effectively equates to user fees for pharmaceutical companies 
that access GISRS data and samples, either through directly funding the network or 
via commitments to provide at least 10 per cent of vaccines and diagnostics at 
reduced prices, raises the possibility that some manufacturers will exit what has 
traditionally been a low-profit industry.  38
Whilst it does not appear that manufacturers are actively leaving the market in order to avoid 
making contributions to GISRS as Kamradt-Scott & Lee feared, the fact that so few PIV 
manufacturers have concluded an SMTA appears to suggest that the majority believe they can 
continue PIV production whilst operating outside of the PIP Framework. Presumably this 
would be achieved by concluding bilateral agreements with states that have relevant viral 
samples in their territory, in a similar fashion to the Indonesia-Baxter agreement.  Indeed, 39
nothing within the PIP Framework prevents states from transferring viral samples to GISRS 
via an SMTA, and concluding a bilateral agreement with a PIV manufacturer that operates 
outside of GISRS. It has further been noted that ‘A few manufacturers are using genetic 
sequence data to make vaccines and other influenza related products ’, a trend that allows 40
manufacturers to make use of data generated via the WHO-GISRS network  but not require 41
access to the viral samples. This would allow them to easily operate within the PIV market 
without being party to an SMTA. This trend is ‘anticipated to increase’ amongst PIV 
manufacturers, due to the anticipated increase in the use of generic sequence data in 
pandemic influenza research and development.  Both of these factors are particularly 42
concerning from a procurement of PIV perspective as manufacturers, by avoiding the need to 
conclude an SMTA in order to gain viral samples, also avoid any obligations to contribute to 
the PIP stockpile, which will reduce as a direct consequence.  
SMTA commitments by manufacturers 
With regard to the PIV manufacturers that have concluded an SMTA, the WHO uses a 
formula based upon the average annual influenza product sales per manufacturer, for the 
three past years, plus the most recent pandemic year when determining contributions towards 
the running costs of GISRS.  Therefore, the greater the manufacturing capacity in the area of 43
influenza vaccines, the higher the partnership contribution costs to be paid for using the 
GISRS system. As the below table indicates, three of the five largest pandemic influenza 
vaccine manufactures are party to an SMTA with the WHO, with the remaining six 
manufacturers that have an SMTA in place being small-to-medium sized manufacturers.  The 
fact that the WHO has managed to successfully negotiate SMTAs with these nine 
manufacturers is clearly a positive step. However, the commitments which the WHO has 
managed to secure, along with the relatively low uptake amongst PIV manufacturers which 
contribute to GISRS, remain concerning. Despite the fact that the standardised SMTA 
provided at Annex 2 provides that manufacturers of vaccines in receipt of viral samples from 
WHO-GISRS should “donate at least 10% of real time pandemic vaccine production to 
WHO” , only the SMTA agreed with Novartis has met this 10% donation commitment. The 44
remaining manufacturers have committed to donate between 7.5-9% of their real-time 
pandemic influenza manufacturing capacity in the event of a pandemic. Equally, the 
expectation was that PIV manufacturers would also commit to “Reserve at least 10% of real 
time pandemic vaccine production at affordable prices to WHO” . However, no 45
manufacturer has committed to reserve 10% of real time production for purchase at 
affordable prices by WHO. The majority of signed agreements have a commitment of around 
2%, with the one outlier being Sanofi Pasteur, with a purchase commitment of 7.5%. 
Table 1: SMTA commitments by pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers
Manufacturer Partership 
Contribu-
tion (USD)
SMT
A in 
place?
Donation 
Commit-
ment (%) 
Purchase 
Commit-
ment (%)
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. 6,158,153 no - -
GlaxoSmithKline 6,158,153 yes 7.5 2.5
Sanofi Pasteur 6,158,153 yes 7.5 7.5
Novartis 2,799,160 yes 10 2.5
BioCSL Pty Ltd. 979,790 no - -
BIKEN 699,790 yes 8 2
The Chemo-Sero-Therapeutic Re-
search Institute (Kaketsuken)
699,790 no - -
Denka-Seiken Co., Ltd. 475,857 no - -
Kitasato Daiichi Sankyo Vaccine Co. 
Ltd. Medicago
335,899 yes 8 2
Green Cross Corp. 335,879 no - -
China National Biotech Group Co. 
Ltd.
307,908 yes 8 2
Sinovac Biotech Co. Ltd. 139,958 yes 8 2
Becton, Dickinson & Company 83,975 no - -
Fluart Innovative Vaccines Ltd. 83,925 no - -
Alere Inc. 39,071 no - -
Focus Diagnostic 30,791 no - -
Saint-Petersburg Scientific Research 
Institute of Vaccines and Sera
30,791 no - -
Cepheid 2,799 no - -
InDevr 2,799 no - -
Institute of Vaccine and Medical Bio-
logicals
2,799 no - -
* This table was generated by cross-referencing the Agreements signed with manufacturers of 
vaccines and/or antivirals (available at http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/benefit_sharing/
SMTA2_catA/en/) with the list of active pandemic vaccine manufacturers that make PIP 
Partnership Contributions to the WHO for using the WHO-GISRS network (available at: 
https://extranet.who.int/pip-pc-implementation/budget.aspx?year=2012) 
Such reductions in the obligations placed upon manufacturers that have SMTAs with the 
WHO, both in terms of donations and reserving doses for purchase at affordable prices by the 
WHO, significantly reduces the vaccination coverage within developing states using the 
stockpile as a procurement method. Despite this, the current PIP stockpile has approximately 
230 million doses committed to it by way of donation.  This is clearly an improvement on 46
the stockpile the WHO managed during 2009-H1N1, which distributed 78 million doses to 
ninety-seven developing states that were considered to lack the ability to purchase vaccine on 
MedImmune (AstraZeneca) Nano-
sphere, Inc.
2,799 yes 9 1
Princeton BioMeditech Corporation 2,799 no - -
Protein Sciences 2,799 no - -
PT BioFarma 2,799 no - -
Qiagen 2,799 no - -
Quidel 2,799 no - -
Response Biomedical Corp 2,799 no - -
Serum Institute of India 2,799 yes 8 2
Takeda Pharmaceuticals Int. 2,799 no - -
The Government Pharmaceutical Or-
ganization (GPO)
2,799 no - -
UMN Pharma 2,799 no - -
Vabiotech 2,799 no - -
Zydus Cadila Healthcare Ltd. 2,769 no - -
Table 1: SMTA commitments by pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers
Manufacturer Partership 
Contribu-
tion (USD)
SMT
A in 
place?
Donation 
Commit-
ment (%) 
Purchase 
Commit-
ment (%)
the commercial market.  However, not all of the doses in the PIP stockpile are reserved 47
specifically for developing states that are unable to procure PIV on the open market, as was 
the case with the 2009-H1N1 donations. The PIP Framework mandates that donated vaccine 
will be distributed according to the following proportions 
One-third ‘for use in affected countries, according to public health risk and need, to 
assist in containing the first outbreak or outbreaks of an emerging pandemic’, two-
thirds to ‘developing countries that have no or inadequate access to H5N1 influenza 
vaccines, on a per capita basis, with use to be determined by those countries.  48
There will of course be some overlap between these two groups where an affected country in 
an outbreak will also be a developing country with no or inadequate access to vaccines. 
However, assuming that two-thirds of this Stockpile is reserved for ‘developing states in 
need’ the stockpile could ensure a vaccination level coverage of 4.14% in developing states 
on a one-dose strategy, and 2.07% on a two-dose strategy, typical of influenza pandemics. 
Both of these are significantly below the target of 33% needed to establish herd immunity 
within a population. While the PIP Stockpile was not explicitly created with the 33% 
vaccination target in mind (nowhere in the drafting or the final text was a vaccination 
coverage target set) a minimum vaccination coverage of at least 33% has been required in all 
previous pandemics in order to establish herd immunity.  In relation to this target, clearly, 49
the commitments provided in the example SMTA do not make procurement from the PIP 
stockpile a particularly attractive procurement option for developing states, particularly if it is 
seeking to procure sufficient vaccine to establish herd immunity levels within their territory. 
When comparing procurement of PIV from the PIP stockpile, with the procurement of PIV 
from the Vaccine Deployment Initiative stockpile the WHO created during 2009-H1N1, it is 
clear that the one major benefit of the PIP stockpile is the potential removal of the time delay 
of donated vaccine being transferred to the WHO, and onwards to recipient states.  Despite 50
this apparent benefit, concern has been expressed by the industry that during an influenza 
pandemic, member states with domestic PIV production within their territory would place 
restrictions upon exports of PIV that have been committed to the PIP stockpile, until domestic 
demand had been fulfilled.  This concern appears to be well founded, many developing 51
states procured less vaccine, and procured it later, than their developed neighbours during 
2009-H1N1.  One reason noted for this was that governments of developed states with 52
domestic manufacturing capacity (that would have benefited from virus sharing by 
developing states) restricted exports to other territories until domestic demand had been 
fulfilled.  As Fidler noted  53
Canada awarded its vaccine contract to a Canadian company because it feared that 
foreign governments might restrict exports to Canada because of vaccine shortages 
within their territories. The Australian government made it clear to the Australian 
manufacturer CSL that it must fulfil the government’s domestic needs before 
exporting vaccine to the United States. The United States [stated that the US] would 
not donate H1N1 vaccine as promised until all at risk Americans had access, because 
production problems had created shortages in the United States.  54
While the WHO Director-General is seeking periodic assurances from Member States that 
they would enable companies to fulfil their SMTA commitments to supply pandemic vaccine 
to WHO on a real-time basis,  it is not yet apparent if these assurances will be given by 55
member states, or indeed, even if they are given, whether they will be honoured during a 
future pandemic. The Director-General appears keen to obtain such assurances as the 
problem of governments of developed states with domestic manufacturing capacity being 
able to prevent the export of PIVs to the WHO or developing states until domestic demand 
has been satisfied has not been resolved by the PIP Framework. Article 14 of the SMTAs 
signed with PIV manufacturers states that ‘no Party shall be liable for any delay in the 
performance of or failure to perform its obligations under this Agreement, where such a delay 
or failure is caused by Force Majeure’,  and the definition provided for ‘Force Majeure’ 56
includes ‘….embargo or requisition’ and ‘acts of government.’ This means that the PIP 57
Framework does not prevent the nationalisation of pandemic influenza vaccination 
manufacturing, or the embargo or requisition of vaccinations by states with domestic 
manufacturing in their territory. Such an embargo or requisition would have a significant 
impact on the viability of the PIP Stockpile by reducing the number of vaccines the Stockpile 
has to distribute, or by causing a significant delay in the delivery of the vaccines to the 
Stockpile, and onward transfer to recipient states. This suggests that it is unlikely that the PIP 
Framework will have, in practice, a significant positive impact on the procurement of 
pandemic influenza vaccines by developing states, or indeed, that the Framework has done 
anything to change the status quo that exists between developed and developing states during 
an influenza pandemic.  
The low uptake of SMTAs amongst PIV manufacturers, combined with the reduced 
commitments being given by PIV manufacturers in those SMTAs that have been concluded, 
make the PIP stockpile a particularly undesirable procurement method for developing states. 
Moreover, even when all of the vaccine that has been committed to the WHO via SMTAs has 
been delivered, it is likely that the WHO will need to seek donations from PIV manufacturers 
(outside of SMTA commitments) and developed states, in order to be able to fulfil the 
procurement needs of developing states (in much the same way they did during 2009-H1N1). 
This is a particularly undesirable scenario because, when making appeals for donated vaccine 
the WHO will again have ‘little leverage to influence developed countries [and PIV 
manufacturers] other than rhetoric about equity, justice, and solidarity’ . If the WHO must 58
again make appeals to equity and justice in order to procure vaccine to donate to developing 
states, as appears likely, it will highlight the significant shortcomings in the PIP Framework, 
which was designed specifically to minimise such a scenario during a pandemic.   
This section has demonstrated that direct procurement from the PIP stockpile is not a viable 
option for developing states seeking to increase their access to pandemic influenza vaccines. 
Whilst procurement from the PIP Stockpile does have one distinct benefit: if developing 
states were to procure vaccines from the PIP Stockpile, then these vaccines ought to be 
distributed within the same timeframe as developed states, providing no embargo or 
requisition occurs.  59
In addition to creating a stockpile for direct procurement, the PIP Framework also attempts to 
increase the transfer of technology from established PIV manufacturers in developed states, 
to new manufacturers in developing states. Transfer of technology, if properly managed, can 
also improve the procurement of pandemic influenza vaccines by developing states. Transfer 
of technology can create a situation whereby developing states are able to contract with 
pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers based in their own territory, as opposed to being 
reliant upon the established manufacturers based in developed states. This would allow 
developing states to have rapid access to pandemic influenza vaccines, and would eliminate 
the risk of developed states with pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers based in their 
territory restricting exports of vaccines until domestic demand has been fulfilled during a 
pandemic.  
Transfer of technology and vaccine procurement 
The importance of developing states having some degree of self-sufficiency in pandemic 
influenza vaccine procurement, by contracting with pandemic influenza vaccine 
manufacturers based in their own territory, as opposed to being reliant upon the established 
manufacturers based in developed states, was highlighted by Friede et al, who noted that 
In 2006, 90% of influenza vaccine production was located in nine countries (largely in 
Europe and North America) that represented only 10% of the global population. Other 
countries, notably those in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, could witness a 
staggering death toll and a severe strain on their health services while waiting for 
producing countries and regions to have vaccinated their own populations.   60
While pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturing capacity has increased since 2006, the 
proportions by which this capacity is divided between developing and developed states has 
remained largely the same, with capacity in developing states still being significantly lower 
than that which is required in order to adequately immunise their populations.  Therefore 61
there is a clear need for developing states, either standing alone or as part of regional groups, 
to move towards self-sufficient procurement ofPIVs. In order to do so, manufacturers based 
in developing states require access to specific technical knowledge that cannot be inferred 
from the patent, and is not available in the public domain, in order to manufacture a PIV. In 
the case of these vaccines, it has been noted that 
[t]he technical know-how − even of conventional egg-derived influenza vaccines − is 
not readily found outside existing influenza vaccine production plants. Thus, even for 
procedures for which there are no patents, securing working partnerships with 
technology holders may be necessary.  62
Without access to such technical knowledge, developing states, or manufacturers in 
developing states, are unable to manufacture their own vaccine as a method of procurement. 
Transfer of technology leading to increased self-procurement from domestic manufacturers is 
arguably the most effective manner by which developing states can sustainably and 
effectively procure sufficient doses of pandemic influenza vaccines, in an appropriate 
timeframe, during a pandemic.  
To this end, at a policy level, the WHO has often encouraged transfer of technology from 
established manufacturers of pandemic influenza vaccines to new manufacturers in 
developing states, in order to improve pandemic preparedness within developing states. In the 
wake of growing concerns over the H5N1 strain of pandemic influenza in late 2005, the 
World Health Assembly passed Resolution WHA58.5, which focused upon strengthening 
pandemic influenza preparedness and response . Resolution WHA58.5 required the 63
Director-General to 
continue to develop WHOs plans and capacity to respond to an influenza pandemic, to 
be able to provide technical support, capacity building and technology transfer related 
to H5N1 influenza vaccines and diagnostics to developing countries.  64
While not specifically related to pandemic influenza vaccines, the next major policy 
development at the WHO regarding transfer of technology in order to improve access to and 
the procurement of medicines was the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property (GSPA-PHI) in 2008. The GSPA-PHI was ‘designed to 
promote innovation, build capacity [and] improve access to medicines,  and aimed to 65
‘promote new thinking on innovation and access to medicine’, as well as ‘provide a medium 
term framework for securing an enhanced and sustainable basis for needs driven essential 
health research and development relevant to diseases which disproportionally affect 
developing countries’.   66
In relation to PIVs, this policy of promoting technology transfer to developing state 
manufacturers was largely facilitated though the WHO Influenza Vaccine Technology 
Transfer Initiative, a collaborative project between the WHO, some developed states and PIV 
manufacturers. The Influenza Vaccine Technology Transfer Initiative aimed to create 
regionally based, independent, and sustainable pandemic influenza vaccine production 
capacity in developing countries, through financial support and technology transfer to 
manufacturers in developing states.  Transfer of technology through the Influenza Vaccine 67
Technology Transfer Initiative was facilitated through the creation of a ‘hub’ for the transfer 
of influenza vaccine technology. The Hub is a platform for transferring a complete 
manufacturing process at ‘pilot scale’ to a new manufacturer in a developing state by granting 
a non-exclusive license for use of the technology, along with providing information and 
training on using the technology, along with relevant safety and efficacy data, which allows 
the recipient to make use of a shortened regulatory pathway for licensing the PIV.  68
The WHO Hub was launched in 2007 and, to date, vaccine manufacturers in seventeen 
developing states have received financial grants, and technical knowledge and understanding 
from the hub, which has enabled them to produce pandemic influenza vaccine.   Despite this 69
success, it is reported that the WHO is concerned that ‘there is a great lack of interested 
technology providers’ wishing to contribute to the Hub ; meaning that the Hub is limited in 70
the amount, or level, of technology available to it to be transferred. The role of the 
technology provider is obviously key to the success of the hub model, as the ‘model can only 
be used with vaccines for which no intellectual property barriers exist in both the country 
hosting the hub and the country receiving the technology’.  Therefore the active engagement 71
of the technology holder to grant a license that effectively removes these barriers in host and 
reciprocal states, as well as providing the technology and know-how, is key to the success of 
the hub model. The result of this lack of interest from technology providers to provide new 
and updated technology to the hub is that recipient manufacturers are unlikely to benefit from 
any of the scientific advances which occur in the field of pandemic influenza vaccines. The 
impact of this is that the pandemic influenza vaccines produced by recipient manufactures 
will not be as effective, or produced in as efficient a manner, as the vaccine produced by 
established manufacturers in developed states.  
Transfer of technology provisions and the PIP Framework 
One of the most notable omissions from the SMTAs that have been signed with PIV 
manufacturers is that none of the agreements currently in place has secured any commitments 
from manufacturers regarding technology transfer.  This is despite the fact that during the 72
negotiations of the PIP Framework, the importance of transfer of technology for pandemic 
preparedness and procurement was stressed in the reports of the Advisory Group on 
Pandemic influenza at the WHO and the WHO Director-General, which were integral to the 
development of the Framework. The Director-General noted that: ‘Preparedness requires 
long-term investment, particularly when capacity building requires training and transfer of 
knowledge,’  whereas the Group stressed the need to achieve the greatest impact by building 73
capacity in states where it is lowest and observed that preparedness requires long-term 
investment, particularly when capacity building requires training and transfer of knowledge .  74
Facilitating the transfer of technology from established PIV manufacturers to manufacturers 
in developing states is one of the clear aims of the PIP Framework. Paragraph 6.0.2(iv) states 
that ‘the PIP Benefit Sharing System will operate to: build capacity in receiving countries 
over time for and through technical assistance and transfer of technology, skills and know-
how and expanded influenza vaccine production, tailored to their public health risk and 
needs’ . Further detail on the WHO’s vision for transfer of technology via PIP is provided at 75
4.6.1-4.6.2, which states that 
The Director-General will continue to work closely with Member States and influenza 
vaccine manufacturers to implement the WHO Global Pandemic Influenza Action 
Plan to Increase Vaccine Supply, including its strategies to build new production 
facilities in developing and/or industrialized countries and through transfer of 
technology, skills and know-how. 
Member States should urge influenza vaccine, diagnostic and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to make specific efforts to transfer these technologies to other 
countries, particularly developing countries, as appropriate. 
Influenza vaccine manufacturers who receive PIP biological materials may grant, 
subject to any existing licensing restrictions, on mutually agreed terms, a non-
exclusive, royalty-free license to any influenza vaccine manufacturer from a 
developing country, to use its intellectual property and other protected substances, 
products, technology, know-how, information and knowledge used in the process of 
influenza vaccine development and production, in particular for pre-pandemic and 
pandemic vaccines for use in agreed developing countries.  76
It is clear that the WHO views increasing transfer of technology as an integral part of the plan 
to increase access to pandemic influenza vaccines and reduce the inequality between 
developing and developed states on this issue, therefore it is necessary to determine to what 
extent transfer of technology provisions have been incorporated into the PIP Framework. This 
is particularly relevant as the PIP Framework represents an ideal opportunity to increase 
transfer of technology to developing states manufacturers. However, despite the clear impetus 
within the WHO, both at a policy level, and in the development of the PIP Framework, the 
resulting obligations which were placed upon manufacturers in regard to transfer of 
technology via the PIP Framework appear particularly weak.  
Within the ‘Obligations of the Company’ in the standardised SMTA provided in the Annex of 
the PIP Framework , the transfer of technology related provisions state that manufacturers of 
vaccines and/or antivirals can commit to 
A5. Grant to manufacturers in developing countries licenses on mutually agreed terms 
that should be fair and reasonable including in respect of affordable royalties, taking 
into account development levels in the country of end use of the products, on 
technology, know-how, products and processes for which it holds IPR for the 
production of (i) influenza vaccines, (ii) adjuvants, (iii) antivirals and/or (iv) 
diagnostics   77
and/or:  
A6. Grant royalty-free licenses to manufacturers in developing countries or grant to 
WHO royalty-free, non-exclusive licenses on IPR, which can be sublicensed, for the 
production of pandemic influenza vaccines, adjuvants, antivirals products and 
diagnostics needed in a pandemic. WHO may sublicense these licenses to 
manufacturers in developing countries on appropriate terms and conditions and in 
accordance with sound public health principles.  78
There is a number of elements concerned with transfer of technology within these SMTA that 
are particularly concerning. Firstly, there is no link between the work of the WHO Influenza 
Vaccine Hub, and the PIP Framework. While Paragraph A.6 does provide the technology 
holder with the option to grant royalty-free, non-exclusive licenses on intellectual property 
rights to the WHO, who can then sublicensed these rights to manufacturers in developing 
states, it makes no reference to the transfer of technical knowhow required to work the 
invention covered by these intellectual property rights also being transferred to the WHO. 
This is concerning because it is not merely the intellectual property rights which pose a 
significant barrier to developing states being able to establish pandemic influenza vaccine 
manufacturing in their territory. While intellectual property rights can be a barrier to 
manufacturers in developing states establishing manufacturing capacity, it is the lack of 
technical knowhow amongst prospective manufacturers in developing states that has clearly 
been identified as the barrier to self-sufficient procurement of pandemic influenza vaccines 
by developing states.  79
Instead, PIV manufacturers that choose to engage with transfer of technology as part of their 
‘Company Obligations’ are compelled only to transfer technology to a non-specific number 
of manufacturers in developing states, meaning the knowledge will only be transferred to a 
limited number of entities, at the technology holder’s discretion on a bilateral basis. 
Technology transfer which occurs on a bilateral basis between an established manufacturer 
acting as donor to a new manufacturer in a developing state has been noted as being ‘not 
readily feasible in cases where there is limited financial benefit for donor’ in the context of 
pandemic influenza vaccines.  Therefore it is particularly concerning that this is the only 80
transfer of technology option which is available as an ‘Obligation of the Company’ within an 
SMTA. Transfer of technology via the PIP Framework could have had significantly greater 
impact if the technology holder were compelled to transfer their knowledge to the WHO 
Influenza Vaccine Hub, along with the right for the hub to transfer this knowledge on again, 
to multiple relevant manufacturers in developing states. This would ensure maximum 
distribution of relevant technical knowledge, which in turn would help build pandemic 
preparedness by increasing vaccine manufacturing capacity in developing states.  
In addition to the above, the wording in each of the transfer of technology provisions in the 
SMTA provisions is too vague. As noted above, if transfer of technology is to occur on a 
bilateral basis from one manufacturer to another, this will only occur when it is financially 
viable for the donor. The wording of paragraph A.5 specifies neither the number of recipient 
manufacturers, not the number of recipient developing states that are to receive transferred 
technology in order to comply with the obligation. This is seemingly left to the PIV 
manufacturer transferring the technology to decide. Moreover, the wording ‘terms that should 
be fair and reasonable’ is again particularly subjective, with both ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ not 
being defined within the Framework, again, leaving it open to the interpretation of donor 
manufacturers. The vague wording of the transfer of technology related provisions within the 
SMTAs, particularly in relation to key terms, will inevitably lead to inconsistencies in the 
amount of technology transfer that will occur, and the terms of the transfer. This may lead to 
donor manufacturers determining that ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ has a particularly low threshold, 
and therefore, they are only obliged to undertake minimal transfer in order to meet this 
requirement.   Whilst it may be the case that some particularly benevolent manufacturer will 
transfer more technology than is deemed ‘fair’ or ‘reasonable’ to a state, this will lead to an 
inequitable situation whereby some developing states have benefited significantly more than 
other recipient states.  
Transfer of technology from an established pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturer to a 
new manufacturer in a developing state has been encouraged by the WHO through its policy 
initiatives, on the basis that it is not intellectual property rights but access to knowledge that 
constitutes the most significant barrier for new manufacturers to begin pandemic influenza 
vaccine production. To this end, the WHO has seen some limited success in transferring 
technology related to the pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturing process from established 
manufacturers, to new ones. Despite this, none of the pandemic influenza vaccine 
manufacturers that have an SMTA in force has committed to transfer technology to the WHO 
as part of its company obligations. However, even if any manufacturer had committed to this, 
the transfer of technology related provisions contained within the Framework are too weak to 
have any real positive impact on the manner in which developing states can establish 
influenza vaccine manufacturing capacity within their territory, in order to achieve sufficient 
access to vaccine during a pandemic. This is a key failing of the Framework, as it is this 
ability to establish manufacturing capacity which looks to be the most suitable method to 
provide developing states with a sustainable and effective method of pandemic influenza 
vaccine procurement. Transfer of technology, along with the removal of intellectual property 
related barriers to production, is key to this being possible. 
Conclusion  
Prior to SMTAs being concluded with PIV manufacturers the academic commentary on the 
PIP Framework was, despite some noted criticism, generally positive. In particular, the 
Framework was hailed as being an innovative model mechanism for guaranteeing access to 
vaccines and affordable life-saving drugs.  However, having considered the SMTAs 81
concluded between the WHO and pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers, this paper has 
argued that such praise appears to be misplaced. Indeed the PIP Framework does provide one 
clear benefit to developing states that procure from it, in that those states that procure vaccine 
from the PIP Framework ought to procure them in the same timeframe as self-procuring 
developed states. However, it is clear that the Framework does not provide an appropriate 
tool by which developing states could procure enough vaccines to meet their public health 
needs. 
Three predominant reasons for this can be identified. First, the provisions within the example 
Standard Material Transfer Agreement provided at the annex to the PIP Framework, fail to 
maximise benefit sharing for developing states, largely due to the overly flexible benefit 
sharing obligations secured in the PIP Framework, and the lack of compulsion requiring 
relevant PIV manufacturers to commit to benefit sharing via a SMTA. Second, the prospect 
of developing states using the PIP Stockpile as a procurement tool becomes even less viable 
when the SMTAs that pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers have signed are taken into 
consideration. Too few of the pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers currently active 
within the market have committed to share benefits with the WHO via an SMTA. This clearly 
impacts undesirably on the number of doses which the PIP Stockpile has available to it for 
distribution to developing states that have been unable to procure vaccine via self-
procurement methods. Finally, the viability of the PIP Stockpile as a procurement method is 
further reduced when the terms which have been secured with the nine manufacturers that are 
party to a SMTA are evaluated. 
Whilst the PIP Framework already contains provisions intended to improve technology 
transfer from technology holders to developing states wishing to be in receipt of said 
technology via SMTA2 Agreements, there is little incentive for technology holders to engage 
with SMTA2 generally, and even less incentive to engage with the specific transfer of 
technology provisions within the SMTAs. In respect of future reforms, it would be beneficial 
if the WHO placed great emphasis on facilitating transfer of technology and knowhow from 
vaccine manufacturers, to developing states, in order for developing states to become less 
reliant upon procurement from established pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers in 
developed states, or receiving donations from the WHO - as these are demonstrably not 
viable options for developing states. Future reform of the PIP Framework ought to strive to 
make a more innovative access and benefit system sharing system which directly links PIV 
manufacturers’ access to viral samples via the PIP Framework with compulsory transfer of 
technology provisions. These reforms should focus on resolving the identified limitations of 
the PIP Framework in respect of transfer of technology, namely: that there is at present little 
incentive for technology holders to engage with SMTA2 generally, and even less incentive to 
engage with the specific transfer of technology provisions within the SMTAs; transfer of 
technology occurs bilaterally between states leading to inconsistencies in technology 
implementation; and there is no link between the work of the WHO Influenza Vaccine Hub, 
and the PIP Framework.
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